Seeing the Forest: A Holistic View of the Rico Statute of Limitations by McNeill, Carli
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 85 | Issue 3 Article 10
3-1-2010
Seeing the Forest: A Holistic View of the Rico
Statute of Limitations
Carli McNeill
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carli McNeill, Seeing the Forest: A Holistic View of the Rico Statute of Limitations, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1231 (2010).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol85/iss3/10
SEEING THE FOREST: A HOLISTIC VIEW OF THE
RICO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Carli McNeill*
INTRODUCTION
"Though rarely the subject of sustained scholarly attention, the
law concerning statutes of limitations fairly bristles with subtle, intri-
cate, often misunderstood issues . . . ."1 Admittedly, the statute of
limitations for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act2 (RICO) is not one of the hottest topics among legal commenta-
tors; yet, the importance of the statute of limitations in civil RICO
cases can hardly be overstated. Even a defendant who has admittedly
(even criminally) violated RICO cannot be held civilly liable if the
injured party does not file a timely complaint. This is true of all civil
causes of action, but the consequences are three times as great for
plaintiffs in civil RICO cases because triple damages are at stake. Sim-
ply put, in a civil RICO case, the difference between a timely and an
untimely complaint can be the difference between recovering nothing
and recovering triple damages. Thus, determining whether the plain-
tiff has brought suit within the limitations period is critical for both
plaintiffs and defendants.
Statutes of limitations contain three discrete aspects: (1) length
of the limitations period, (2) accrual, and (3) tolling. These three
aspects work in concert. It simply does not make sense to view them
in isolation.3 This certainly is not a new revelation, but it is too often
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.A., Political
Science and Economics, Union College, 2007. Thanks to Professor G. Robert Blakey
for inspiring this Note topic, to the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their
tireless work, and to my family, especially my parents, James and Rosemary.
1 Wolin v. Smith Barney Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 849 (1996) (Posner, J.).
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
3 SeeJohnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463 (1975) ("Any period
of limitation . . . is understood fully only in the context of the various circumstances
that suspend it from running against a particular cause of action."); cf Klehr v. A.O.
Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 199 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[A]ny period of limi-
tation is utterly meaningless without specification of the event that starts it running.
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ignored. Indeed, forty years after the passage of RICO, courts have
still not developed a coherent and comprehensive view of the RICO
statute of limitations that includes all three aspects. Commentators,
too, have failed to propose a complete and coherent view of the RICO
statute of limitations. This is not to say that commentators have
ignored the RICO statute of limitations. Rather, they have tended to
focus on single, discrete aspects of the RICO statute of limitations;
specifically, commentators have generally focused on which limita-
tions period courts should adopt 4 (the RICO statute does not contain
its own statute of limitations) and when the RICO statute of limita-
tions should accrue.5
Now that both of these issues have (for all practical purposes)
been settled,6 this Note takes up the last statute of limitations issue,
tolling, and examines it in conjunction with the other two aspects of
the RICO statute of limitations. By so doing, this Note will offer a
comprehensive view of the RICO statute of limitations that is consis-
tent not only with the current state of the law but also with the pur-
poses of statutes of limitations generally. Part I of this Note discusses
the purposes of statutes of limitations. Part II discusses how the law
has developed regarding the length of the RICO limitations period
and when it accrues as well as the problems that arise when the discov-
ery accrual rule is applied to civil RICO claims. Part III identifies toll-
ing doctrines that courts can use to solve the problems associated with
the discovery accrual rule and proposes a new tolling rule for RICO
taken from the Clayton Antitrust Act. The Conclusion summarizes
how taking into account all three aspects of the RICO statute of limita-
tions leads to a complete and coherent timeliness rule that is fair to
plaintiffs and defendants alike.
I. THE PURPOSES OF CIVIL STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
The overarching aim of statutes of limitations is to balance the
needs of plaintiffs against those of defendants and of society. As a
general matter, plaintiffs should be able to sue for compensation
when injured, but at some point the defendant's "right to be free of
stale claims . . . prevail[s] over the [victim's] right to prosecute
As a practical matter, a 4-year statute of limitations means nothing at all unless one
knows when the four years start running.").
4 See, e.g., Elizabeth D. De Armond, Note, A Uniform Limitations Period for Civil
RICO, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 495 (1986).
5 See, e.g., Mary S. Humes, Note, RICO and a Unform Rule of Accrual, 99 YALE L.J.
1399 (1990).
6 See infra Parts II.A.2 & II.B.3.
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them."'7 Thus, the primary purpose of statutes of limitations is to give
plaintiffs an incentive to litigate claims without unreasonable delay.8
In so doing, statutes of limitations benefit defendants by providing
repose when the plaintiff has slept on his claim.9 Furthermore, stat-
utes of limitations protect defendants from having to defend them-
selves against stale (and perhaps even fraudulent) charges when so
much time has passed that evidence has been lost.10 Statutes of limita-
tions also provide certainty to potential defendants, notifying them of
the length of their exposure to liability." The certainty and finality
provided by statutes of limitations benefits society as well by letting
bygones be bygones and allowing everyone to move on. 12 More specif-
ically, society is benefitted when courts are relieved of the burden of
trying stale cases.' 3
How can legislatures and courts appropriately balance the inter-
ests of plaintiffs, defendants, and society when dealing with a statute
of limitations issue? The most important thing legislatures and courts
can do is keep in mind that a statute of limitations is not just a num-
ber. There are three aspects to every statute of limitations: (1) the
length of the limitations period, (2) the point at which the limitations
period begins to run (accrual), and (3) circumstances that toll the
limitations period. When a legislature or court faces a decision that
affects any of these three aspects, it must consider the purposes
7 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944).
8 See Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. 386, 390 (1869) (7 Wall.)
("[Statutes of limitations] are founded upon the general experience of mankind that
claims, which are valid, are not usually allowed to remain neglected.... The policy of
these statutes is to encourage promptitude in the prosecution of remedies."); see also
Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) ("[Statutes of limitations] stimulate to
activity and punish negligence.").
9 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); see also Wood, 101 U.S. at
139 ("[Statutes of limitations] promote repose by giving security and stability to
human affairs.").
10 See R. Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 348-49; see also Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v.
Harriman, 227 U.S. 657, 672 (1913) ("The policy of statutes of limitation is to
encourage promptness in the bringing of actions, that the parties shall not suffer by
loss of evidence from death or disappearance of witnesses, destruction of documents
or failure of memory.").
11 See Guar. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1938) ("The
statute of limitations is a statute of repose, designed to protect the citizens from stale
and vexatious claims, and to make an end to the possibility of litigation after the lapse
of a reasonable time.").
12 See Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 1975).
13 See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965); see also Chase Sec.
Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945) ("[Statutes of limitations] are practical
and pragmatic devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims . . . .
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behind statutes of limitations because decisions about accrual and toll-
ing implicate the purposes of statutes of limitations just as much as the
determination of the length of the limitations period. Furthermore,
legislatures and courts must be aware of how the three aspects of stat-
utes of limitations work together. For example, when a legislature is
determining what the length of the limitations period should be, it
cannot appropriately balance the interests of plaintiffs, defendants,
and society without also considering when the limitations period
should accrue because "any period of limitation is utterly meaningless
without specification of the event that starts it running."14 Perhaps
this seems like an obvious point, but legislatures continually enact stat-
utes of limitations without any reference to when the limitations
period should accrue or be tolled. 15
II. WHERE ARE WE Now? (AND How DID WE GET HERE?)
When Congress passed the RICO Act in 1970, it included a civil
cause of action but no statute of limitations. As a result, for forty
years, courts have struggled with RICO statute of limitations issues.
The first major problem courts confronted was determining what limi-
tations period to apply to RICO. The second problem was determin-
ing when that limitations period begins to run (accrue). This Part
traces how the courts have dealt with these two problems.
A. Length of the Limitations Period
1. Before Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.
Before 1987, when the Supreme Court decided Agency Holding
Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.,16 civil RICO cases did not have a
clearly applicable limitations period.17 One might assume that by
passing RICO without a statute of limitations Congress intended that
no statute of limitations should govern civil RICO claims; however,
courts have not taken this approach. Except in rare circumstances,
when a federal cause of action lacks an express limitations period,
courts assume that a limitations period should apply and adopt the
14 Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 199 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
15 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15b (2006) ("Any action to enforce any cause of action
under section 15, 15a, or 15c of this title shall be forever barred unless commenced
within four years after the cause of action accrued.").
16 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
17 See infra text accompanying notes 25-42 for a discussion of the Malley-Duff
case.
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most closely analogous limitations period provided by state law.18 In
theory, at least, adopting state limitations periods ensures that some
limitations period will apply to bar stale federal claims and thus vindi-
cate the rationales in favor of statutes of limitations.19 In practice,
though, the adoption of state limitations periods tends to undermine
the purposes of statutes of limitations and lead to forum shopping
and unfairness.
As a general matter, applying state statutes of limitations to fed-
eral causes of action promotes uncertainty and a lack of uniformity.20
This is because limitations periods vary from state to state so the appli-
cation of state statutes of limitations to a federal cause of action will
necessarily lead to diverse limitations periods applying to the same
federal cause of action. This, however, is the least of the complica-
tions. The statute of limitations for a given federal cause of action
may also vary among different districts within states and even case to
case depending on how the federal district courts characterize the
cause of action and apply state borrowing statutes.21 This lack of uni-
formity and certainty can make it almost impossible for plaintiffs to
determine when they are required to file their claims and for defend-
ants and society to benefit from the repose that statutes of limitations
18 What limitations period, if any, to apply to federal causes of action when Con-
gress has not specified a limitations period is a problem that has plagued courts for
over 175 years. See generally Mitchell A. Lowenthal et al., Time Bars in Specialized Federal
Common Law: Federal Rights ofAction and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L. REv.
1011, 1025-42 (1980) (describing the development of the practice of adopting state
statutes of limitations for federal causes of action). When Congress does not explicitly
designate a limitations period, courts have numerous options. In most cases, courts
analogize the federal cause of action to a state cause of action for which there is a
limitations period and then adopt that limitations period for the federal cause of
action. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 181 (1976) (applying a two-year
Virginia state statute of limitations to a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981). If a
court decides that adopting a state limitations period is inappropriate, it can adopt a
federal limitations period by analogy, see Malley-Duff 483 U.S. at 156; it can apply the
doctrine of laches, see Holmburg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1946); it can
judicially create a limitations period (something courts are reluctant to do), see UAW
v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1966); or it can opt to apply no
limitations period, see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 355, 368-72 (1977).
19 Furthermore, because courts have consistently applied state statutes of limita-
tions to federal actions that lack limitations periods, it is a fair inference that "Con-
gress intends by its silence that [courts] borrow state law." Malley-Duff 483 U.S. at
147.
20 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 272 n.25 (1985).
21 See Neil Sobol, Comment, Determining Limitation Periods for Actions Arising Under
Federal Statutes, 41 Sw. L.J. 895, 904-11 (1987); Lowenthal et al., supra note 18, at
1057-84, 1095-1104.
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are supposed to provide. 22 Furthermore, this complicated area of law
increases litigation, thereby delaying a final decision on the merits of
the case-a problem that statutes of limitations, as bright-line rules,
are supposed to prevent. 23 The lack of uniformity can also lead to
forum shopping and unfairness. Finally, adopting state limitations
periods for federal causes of action is inherently problematic because
state legislatures design state limitations periods with state interests
and particular state causes of action in mind. Thus, applying a state
limitations period to a federal cause of action may frustrate the pur-
poses of the federal cause of action. These problems associated with
applying state limitations periods to federal causes of action were all
on display when, before Malley-Duff courts tried to apply state statutes
of limitations to civil RICO cases. 24
2. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.
In light of all the problems associated with applying state statutes
of limitations to civil RICO claims, the Supreme Court, in 1987, finally
undertook to provide a uniform limitations period for civil RICO.
The facts of Malley-Duff are nondescript. Malley-Duff & Associ-
ates, Inc. ("Malley-Duff') was an agent of Crown Life Insurance Com-
pany ("Crown Life") engaged in selling insurance in the Pittsburgh
area.25 When Malley-Duff failed to meet its annual production quota,
Crown Life terminated its agency.26 Malley-Duff then filed suit alleg-
ing, among other things, violations of RICO. 2 7 The district court
granted summary judgment for Crown Life on the RICO claims "on
the ground that they were barred by Pennsylvania's 2-year statute of
limitations period for fraud."28 The court of appeals reversed, hold-
ing instead that the appropriate statute of limitations was Penn-
sylvania's six-year "catchall" statute of limitations.29 The Supreme
Court then granted certiorari "to resolve the important question of
22 Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275 n.34 ("On a human level, uncertainty is costly to all
parties. Plaintiffs may be denied their just remedy if they delay in filing their claims,
having wrongly postulated that the courts would apply a longer statute. Defendants
cannot calculate their contingent liabilities, not knowing with confidence when their
delicts lie in repose.").
23 See id. at 275.
24 See Robert E. Wood, Civil RICO-Limitations in Limbo, 21 WIILAMETTrE L. REV.
683, 696-702 (1985).
25 Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff& Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 145 (1987).
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 146.
29 Id.
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the appropriate statute of limitations for civil enforcement actions
brought under RICO."3 0
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,3 1 began the Court's
analysis by asserting that borrowing a statute of limitations from state
law was not the only option open to courts:
"[A]s the courts have often discovered, there is not always an obvi-
ous state-law choice for application to a given federal cause of
action; yet resort to state law remains the norm for borrowing of
limitations periods. Nevertheless, when a rule from elsewhere in
federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than available state stat-
utes, and when the federal policies at stake and the practicalities of
litigation make that rule a significantly more appropriate vehicle for
interstitial lawmaking, we have not hesitated to turn away from state
law. "32
After discussing the problems associated with applying state limi-
tations periods to civil RICO, including inconsistency and resultant
uncertainty, the Court concluded that this was just such an instance
where federal policies and the practicalities of litigation required the
Court to adopt a uniform limitations period provided by federal law.33
The limitations period the court decided on was the four-year
limitations period from the Clayton Antitrust Act.34 The Court chose
this particular limitations period because RICO was in large part
modeled on the Clayton Act,35 and therefore the Clayton Act pro-
vided a far better analogy to RICO than any other federal or state
alternative.3 6 Not only was the Clayton Act the best analogy for civil
RICO, but adopting the Clayton Act's nationally uniform four-year
limitations period for all civil RICO claims would also prevent forum
shopping,3 7 promote RICO's remedial purposes by avoiding the appli-
30 Id.
31 Malley-Duff was an eight-to-one decision. Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment.
32 Malley-Duff 483 U.S. at 148 (alteration in original) (quoting DelCostello v.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 171-72 (1983)).
33 Id. at 148-50.
34 Id. at 152. The statute of limitations for the Clayton Antitrust Act is found at
15 U.S.C. § 15b (2006):
Any action to enforce any cause of action under section 15, 15a, or 15c of
this title shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after
the cause of action accrued. No cause of action barred under existing law
on the effective date of this Act shall be revived by this Act.
35 See Malley-Duff 483 U.S. at 151.
36 See id. at 150-51.
37 See id. at 153-54.
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cation of "unduly short state statutes of limitation [s] ,"38 and lead to
certainty, consistency, and less litigation.3 9 Accordingly, the Court
held that the Clayton Act's four-year statute of limitations was "the
most appropriate limitations period for RICO actions."40 Because
Malley-Duff had filed its RICO claims less than four years after the
earliest possible time that the claims could have accrued, the Court
concluded that the claims were timely and affirmed the judgment of
the court of appeals. 4 1 In so doing, the Court specifically reserved the
question of when exactly RICO's new four-year limitations period
accrues.4 2
B. Accrual
The traditional accrual rule is that a statute of limitations begins
to run as soon as all the events have occurred that enable the plaintiff
to maintain a suit under the cause of action at issue.43 This rule gives
plaintiffs the full limitations period to file their claim after it arises but
no longer. Although this accrual rule has the advantage of certainty,
it can lead to unfairness. For instance, a plaintiff may be able to bring
suit in theory because all of the events comprising the cause of action
have occurred, but realistically the plaintiff may be unable to bring suit
because (through no fault of his own) he is unaware that he has suf-
fered an actionable injury. The classic example is medical
malpractice:
In the usual case, the fact of injury provides adequate notice of the
cause of the injury and of the possibility that one's legal rights have
been invaded. This general rule, however, is often inapplicable to
medical malpractice claims. The reason for the exception is essen-
38 See id. at 154.
39 See id. at 150.
40 Id. at 156.
41 Id. at 156-57.
42 Id.
43 See Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes of Limitations, 37
CREIGHTON L. REV. 493, 511-12 (2004). Certainly, the statute of limitations should
not begin to run before the plaintiff can legally bring suit. See Spannaus v. U.S. Dep't
ofJustice, 824 F.2d 52, 56 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("That a statute of limitations cannot
begin to run against a plaintiff before the plaintiff can maintain a suit in court seems
virtually axiomatic."). In Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar
Corp. of California, 522 U.S. 192 (1997), the Supreme Court stated that "[a] limitations
period ordinarily does not begin to run until the plaintiff has a 'complete and present
cause of action.'" Id. at 195 (quoting Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U.S. 96, 98 (1941)).
According to the Court, "Unless Congress has told us otherwise in the legislation at
issue, a cause of action does not become 'complete and present' for limitations pur-
poses until the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief." Id. at 201.
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tially the same as for the general rule, i.e., a patient often has little
or no reason to believe his legal rights have been invaded simply
because some misfortune followed medical treatment. Sometimes a
patient may remain unaware for many years that he has suffered
injury or he may recognize his injury but not its cause. Indeed, the
facts necessary to discover the causal relation between treatment
and injury may be within the exclusive control of the physician or at
least very difficult to obtain. 44
Because of the fairness issue, courts began to replace the traditional
rule with the discovery rule of accrual.4 5 Now, the discovery rule is the
default accrual rule for federal causes of action. 46
Of course, had Congress specified in the RICO statute when a
civil action accrues then, fair or unfair, courts would have to abide by
Congress's determination. As with the limitations period, however,
Congress remained silent.4 7 Thus, federal courts have had to decide
the appropriate point of accrual for civil RICO claims, and different
federal courts developed different accrual rules including the last
predicate act rule, the injury and pattern discovery rule, the discovery
rule, and the Clayton Act accrual rule. This split among the federal
courts undermined the uniformity and certainty that the Supreme
Court sought when it borrowed the four-year limitations period from
the Clayton Act. As a result, the Supreme Court had to address for a
second time a RICO statute of limitations issue.
1. The Last Predicate Act Rule and Klehr v. A. 0. Smith Corp.
Initially, some district courts adopted the last predicate act rule-
a rule unique to RICO that takes into account the continuing nature
44 Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1980) (citations
omitted).
45 According to Adam Bain and Ugo Colella, "The genesis of the discovery rule of
accrual for federal statutes of limitations was the Supreme Court's decision in Urie v.
Thompson." Bain & Colella, supra note 43, at 553 (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S.
163 (1949)).
46 See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000).
47 Congress remained silent regarding accrual until 1995 when it amended
§ 1964(c) to disallow plaintiffs from using securities fraud as a predicate act in civil
actions unless the defendant had been criminally convicted "in connection with the
fraud." Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 107,
109 Stat. 737, 758 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006)). If the defendant had
been criminally convicted, the plaintiff could use securities fraud as a predicate act in
a civil action, "in which case the statute of limitations [would] start to run on the date
on which the conviction becomes final." Id. This rule of accrual, however, only
applies in this limited context.
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of a RICO violation. This rule was borrowed from criminal RICO 48
and under it a claim accrues when the last predicate act of racketeer-
ing occurs.4 9 Thus, so long as the defendant commits a predicate act
within the four-year limitations period, the plaintiff can recover for all
injuries he sustained due to the defendant's pattern of racketeering
regardless of when the injuries occurred or when the plaintiff discov-
ered his injuries.5 0
No circuit court has ever adopted the above version of the last
predicate act rule, but the Third Circuit in Keystone Insurance Co. v.
Houghton1 adopted a variation of the last predicate act rule that
included a discovery element. In Keystone, the court sought an accrual
rule that took into account the continuing nature of a RICO offense
(i.e., its pattern element)52 and that would not start the statute of limi-
tations running until all of the elements of the cause of action
existed.53 Under the rule the court developed, the limitations period
would start to run
from the date the plaintiff knew or should have known that the ele-
ments of the civil RICO cause of action existed unless, as a part of
the same pattern of racketeering activity, there is further injury to
the plaintiff or further predicate acts occur, in which case the
accrual period shall run from the time when the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the last injury or the last predicate act which
is part of the same pattern of racketeering activity. 54
The court explained that "[t]he last predicate act need not have
resulted in injury to the plaintiff but must be part of the same pattern"
in order to extend the limitations period.55 Like the simpler version
of the last predicate act rule used by some district courts, under the
Keystone accrual rule, the plaintiff can recover for all injuries caused by
the same pattern of racketeering even if the injuries occurred or were
48 A criminal violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (operating an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity) is a continuing offense, so the statute of limitations
runs from the last act of racketeering in the pattern. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c); see United
States v. Yashar, 166 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 1999).
49 See County of Cook v. Berger, 648 F. Supp. 433, 435 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
50 See id. Thus, the last predicate act rule is not a rule of separate accrual. See
infra text accompanying note 92.
51 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1988), abrogated by Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S.
179 (1997).
52 Id. at 1129-30.
53 Id. at 1130 ("It would appear fundamental that the four-year statute of limita-
tions for civil RICO may not begin to run until each of the elements of the cause of
action exist.").
54 Id. at 1130.
55 Id.
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discovered more than four years before the claim was filed so long as
the last predicate act occurred within the limitations period.56
The advantage of the last predicate act rule is that it recognizes
the continuous nature of a RICO offense and, as a result, it does not
start the limitations period running until either the pattern of racke-
teering ends or until the plaintiff discovers the last predicate act that
marks the end of the pattern. Furthermore, with either iteration of
the last predicate act rule there is no danger that the limitations
period will start running before a RICO violation has actually
occurred.57 Thus, plaintiffs will be able to recover for all injuries
caused by the same pattern of racketeering. Accordingly, the Keystone
court argued that this plaintiff-friendly accrual rule is consistent with
the text of RICO and is necessary to effectuate its broad remedial
purposes.58
Though the last predicate act rule offers several advantages, it has
its flaws-at least according to the Supreme Court, which rejected the
last predicate act rule in Klehr v. A.0. Smith Corp.59 In Klehr, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the aforementioned cir-
cuit split that had developed regarding the appropriate accrual rule
for civil RICO.60 Klehr involved a suit by dairy farmers against A.O.
Smith Corporation for selling faulty silos. 61 The farmers' RICO claim
was filed so late, however, that the only accrual rule that could have
saved it was the rule from Keystone.62 The Court held that this accrual
rule was "not a proper interpretation of the law" for "two basic rea-
sons."63 First, the separate accrual rule "lengthens the limitations
period dramatically" because a pattern of racketeering "can continue
indefinitely."64 The Court concluded that Congress did not contem-
plate this dramatic extension of the limitations period.6 5 Further-
more, the Court found that such a long limitations period
undermines the repose that statutes of limitations are supposed to
56 Id. at 1130-31.
57 This is one of the major flaws of the discovery accrual rule. See infra text
accompanying notes 94-102.
58 Keystone, 863 F.2d at 1131-33.
59 521 U.S. 179 (1997).
60 At the time, some circuit courts applied the injury and pattern discovery rule,
others applied the discovery rule, and the Third Circuit applied the last predicate act
rule from Keystone. See id. at 185-86; Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 87 F.3d 231, 239 (8th
Cir. 1996).
61 Klehr, 521 U.S. at 183-84.
62 Id. at 186.
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provide and allows plaintiffs to sit on their rights while memories fade
and evidence erodes. 6 6
The second reason why the court rejected the last predicate act
rule of accrual is because it "is inconsistent with the ordinary Clayton
Act rule, applicable in private antitrust treble damages actions,"67
under which the statute of limitations begins to run from the occur-
rence of the injury." The Court then used the Clayton Act rule to
illustrate what it saw as the flaws in the last predicate act rule. Specifi-
cally, the Court disapproved of how the last predicate act rule, unlike
the Clayton Act rule, allowed plaintiffs to "use an independent, new
predicate act as a bootstrap to recover for injuries caused by other
earlier predicate acts that took place outside the limitations period."6 9
Though the Klehr Court relied on the Clayton Act analogy to reject
the last predicate act rule, it did not select the Clayton Act rule7 0 or
any other accrual rule to govern civil RICO claims. 7' Thus, the circuit
courts remained split between the discovery rule and the injury and
pattern discovery rule.72
2. The Injury and Pattern Discovery Rule and Rotella v. Wood
Under the injury and pattern discovery rule, "a civil RICO cause
of action begins to accrue as soon as the plaintiff discovers, or reason-
ably should have discovered, both the existence and source of his
injury and that the injury is part of a pattern."7 3 Before Rotella v.
Wood,74 three circuit courts used this rule of accrual for civil RICO.7 5
Like the last predicate act rule, the injury and pattern discovery rule
takes into account the pattern element of a RICO cause of action;
thus, the statute of limitations will never start to run before a RICO
violation has actually occurred. However, unlike the last predicate act
rule, the injury and pattern discovery rule is a separate accrual rule, so
66 Id.
67 Id. at 188.
68 See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
69 Klehr, 521 U.S. at 189-90.
70 See id. at 188.
71 See id. at 192-93 (declining to choose a single accrual rule for civil RICO).
72 See supra note 60.
73 Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546, 1554-55
(11th Cir. 1990), abrogated by Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549 (2000). Like the Clayton
Act rule and the discovery rule, this rule is a separate accrual rule. See infra notes
91-92 and accompanying text.
74 528 U.S. 549 (2000).
75 See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 87 F.3d 231, 238 (8th Cir. 1996), affd, 521 U.S.
179 (1997); Caproni v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 15 F.3d 614, 619-20 (6th Cir. 1994); Bath
v. Bushkin, Gaims, Gaines &Jonas, 913 F.2d 817, 820-21 (10th Cir. 1990).
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it does not permit plaintiffs to sleep on their rights. Once the plaintiff
is aware, or should be aware, that he has suffered an injury due to a
pattern of racketeering activity, he has the four-year limitations period
(and no longer) within which to commence suit. If a plaintiffs cause
of action is time-barred under the injury and pattern discovery rule, it
will be because he did not exercise reasonable diligence to discover
his claim or because he was aware of the claim but slept on his rights.
Even though the injury and pattern discovery rule does not
lengthen the limitations period as dramatically as the last predicate
act rule, the Supreme Court still rejected it in Rotella v. Wood. In
Rotella, the plaintiff sued "a group of doctors and related business
entities" for a violation of RICO in connection with his stay in a psychi-
atric hospital.76 Because the Court had left the circuit split unresolved
in Klehr, it was hearing its second case in three years on the accrual of
the RICO statute of limitations. Like the situation in Klehr, only one
accrual rule could save Rotella's claim (this time the injury and pat-
tern discovery rule),7 and again, like in Klehr, the Supreme Court
rejected that one accrual rule but did not finally decide on an accrual
rule for civil RICO.78
The Supreme Court rejected the injury and pattern discovery
rule for three reasons. First, the Court found that the rule violated
the policies behind statutes of limitations including repose by, in
many circumstances, extending the limitations period "well beyond
the time when a plaintiffs cause of action is complete."79 Second, the
Court found that the injury and pattern discovery rule was an unjusti-
fied extension of the traditional discovery rule.80 Under the tradi-
tional rule, the "discovery of the injury, not [the] discovery of the
other elements of a claim, is what starts the clock."81 The Court rea-
soned that the traditional discovery rule governs other causes of
action where the elements of the claim may be difficult to ascertain
(like medical malpractice), so that a RICO pattern can be difficult to
76 See Rotella, 528 U.S. at 551.
77 Id.
78 See id. at 554 & n.2. After the Supreme Court rejected the last predicate act
rule in Klehr and the injury and pattern discovery rule in Rotella, the discovery rule was
the only accrual rule used in the circuit courts that the Supreme Court had not
rejected. See id. at 554. Nonetheless, the Court in Rotella refused to "settle upon a
final rule," id. at 554 n.2, leaving open for itself the possibility of applying the Clayton
Act rule in a future case.
79 Id. at 558. The Court also argued that the rule would result in uncertainty
because it would be difficult to pinpoint when the plaintiff discovered, or should have
discovered, a complex racketeering pattern. Id. at 559.
80 Id. at 555-57.
81 Id. at 555.
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identify is not enough to justify departing from the traditional rule.82
Third, the Court-again stressing the Clayton Act analogy-found
that the injury and pattern discovery rule is inconsistent with the Clay-
ton Act's injury accrual rule. 3 In particular, the Court argued that
one of the purposes behind the civil provisions in RICO and the Clay-
ton Act is "to supplement Government efforts to deter and penalize
the respectively prohibited practices." 84 The Court reasoned that the
Clayton Act's accrual rule better accomplishes this purpose by forcing
plaintiffs to file their claims earlier, thereby allowing the public bene-
fit to accrue sooner.85
3. The Discovery Rule
After Rotella, two potential accrual rules remained-the discovery
rule and the Clayton Act rule. The discovery rule is the default fed-
eral accrual rule and is usually applied when a statute does not specify
when a cause of action accrues.8 6 Under this rule a civil RICO claim
accrues when the plaintiff knows, or should have known, of the injury
on which his cause of action is based.87 The first circuit court to adopt
the discovery accrual rule for RICO was the Ninth Circuit in Compton
v. Ide.8 This court, having found no authority that stated when a civil
RICO action accrues, imposed the default federal accrual rule.89 In
Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades,90 the Second Circuit clarified that the
discovery rule (as applied to RICO) is a rule of separate accrual 9 1-
meaning that, for each "new and independent" injury that the plain-
tiff suffers, a separate cause of action with a separate statute of limita-
tions accrues.92
As we have seen, even though the RICO statute says nothing
about when a cause of action accrues93 and even though the discovery
rule is the default federal accrual rule, some courts were reluctant to
apply the discovery rule to civil RICO claims. Instead, these courts
82 Id. at 555-57.
83 Id. at 557.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 557-58.
86 See supra text accompanying note 46.
87 See Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 510 (9th Cir. 1996).
88 732 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984).
89 Id. at 1433.
90 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988).
91 See id. at 1103.
92 See Grimmett, 75 F.3d at 510.
93 But see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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developed unique accrual rules specially designed for RICO. There
are two general reasons for this practice.
First, courts and commentators have argued that the discovery
rule does not properly take into account the pattern element of a
RICO cause of action, i.e., its continuous nature.9 4 To explain, a pre-
requisite for a civil RICO claim is a "pattern" of racketeering activity.95
Under RICO, a pattern of racketeering requires at least two predicate
acts committed within a ten-year period.9 6 In Sedima, S.P.RL. v. Imrex
Co.,9 7 the Supreme Court indicated that although two acts are "neces-
sary" to form a pattern, they are not necessarily "sufficient" to estab-
lish a RICO pattern.9 8 The Sedima Court held that, in order to form a
pattern, the alleged predicate acts could not be isolated incidents,
rather there had to be some relationship between the alleged acts.99
The discovery rule, by starting the statute of limitations running
as soon as the plaintiff discovers (or should have discovered) his
injury, disregards RICO's pattern requirement. Under the discovery
rule, if the plaintiff discovers his injury before the defendant has com-
mitted the right combination of predicate acts to constitute a pattern,
the statute of limitations begins running before the plaintiff can actu-
ally bring a civil RICO claim.100 For example, if the defendant com-
mits the predicate acts more than four years apart, a victim who is only
injured by the first predicate act may (depending on when he discov-
ers or should have discovered his injury) be barred from bringing a
civil RICO claim by the statute of limitations even when the language
of the RICO statute creates no such barrier.101 Even if our hypotheti-
cal victim is also injured by the subsequent, pattern-forming predicate
acts, he may be unable to recover under RICO for his initial injury
despite the fact that it is part of the same pattern. In sum, under the
discovery rule, victims may not be able to recover for all their RICO
injuries even though they are part of the same pattern, some victims
94 See e.g., Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1133 (3d Cir. 1988),
abrogated by Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 (1997); Paul B. O'Neill, "Mother of
Mercy, Is This the Beginning of RICO?": The Proper Point of Accrual of a Private Civil RICO
Action, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 172, 205 (1990).
95 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2006).
96 Id. § 1961(5).
97 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
98 Id. at 496 n.14.
99 See id.
100 Thus violating the principle that the statute of limitations should not begin to
run until all the events have occurred that enable the plaintiff to maintain a cause of
action. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
101 Under the express language of the statue, predicate acts can form a pattern
even if they are as many as ten years apart. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5).
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with RICO injuries will not be able to recover under RICO at all, and
other victims may be given an artificially short limitations period in
which to file their RICO claim-all this because the discovery rule
allows the statute of limitations to start running before all the ele-
ments of a RICO cause of action exist.102
The second reason why courts developed unique accrual rules for
RICO is because a RICO claim is complex and it may be difficult for
plaintiffs to discover the pattern of activity that enables them to bring
a RICO claim or the person(s) responsible for that pattern.103 The
discovery rule does not take these difficulties into account either.
Under the discovery rule, the clock starts running as soon as the plain-
tiff discovers his injury, even if he is completely unaware of who is
responsible for his injury or that he was injured by an act that is part
of a larger pattern.
In spite of the problems that can occur when courts apply the
discovery rule to civil RICO, almost every circuit court has adopted
this accrual rule in the wake of the Supreme Court's rejection of the
more plaintiff friendly accrual rules in Klehr and Rotella.10 4 Thus, even
though the Rotella Court refused to designate the discovery rule as the
governing accrual rule for civil RICO, it has become just that.
4. The Clayton Act Rule
In spite of the widespread adoption of the discovery rule, the
Clayton Act accrual rule lives on as a potential alternative. In Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,105 the Supreme Court set out the
accrual rule for claims under the Clayton Act:
102 See O'Neill, supra note 94, at 205-06.
103 See Marcus R. Mumford, Completing Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., and Resolving the
Oddity and Lingering Questions of Civil RICO Statute of Limitations Accrual, 1998 BYU L.
REv. 1273, 1296-99.
104 See Cetel v. Kirwan Fin. Group, Inc., 460 F.3d 494, 507 (3d Cir. 2006); Living
Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d 353, 365 (9th Cir. 2005);
Barry Aviation, Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Mun. Airport Comm'n, 377 F.3d 682, 688 (7th
Cir. 2004); Taylor Group v. ANR Storage Co., 24 F. App'x 319, 325 (6th Cir. 2001);
Pac. Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 252 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2001)
(assuming that the discovery rule applies without deciding); Love v. Nat'l Med.
Enters., 230 F.3d 765, 774 (5th Cir. 2000); Lares Group, II v. Tobin, 221 F.3d 41, 44
(1st Cir. 2000); In re Merrill Lynch Ltd. P'ships Litig., 154 F.3d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1998);
Detrick v. Panalpina, Inc., 108 F.3d 529, 537 (4th Cir. 1997); Chalabi v. Hashemite
Kingdom ofJordan, 503 F. Supp. 2d 267, 273 (D.D.C. 2007); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Watson, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1033 (W.D. Ark. 2000). But see Cory v. Aztec Steel Bldg.,
Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1234 (10th Cir. 2006) (declining to decide between the discovery
rule and the injury occurrence rule).
105 401 U.S. 321 (1971).
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[A] cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run when a
defendant commits an act that injures a plaintiffs business. . . . In
the context of a continuing conspiracy to violate the antitrust
laws .. . this has usually been understood to mean that each time a
plaintiff is injured by an act of the defendants a cause of action
accrues to him to recover the damages caused by that act and that,
as to those damages, the statute of limitations runs from the com-
mission of the act. However, each separate cause of action that so
accrues entitles a plaintiff to recover not only those damages which
he has suffered at the date of accrual, but also those which he will
suffer in the future from the particular invasion, including what he
has suffered during and will predictably suffer after trial.106
The Zenith Court made one exception to this accrual rule. If a
plaintiff cannot recover future damages because they are too specula-
tive, "the cause of action for future damages, if they ever occur, will
accrue only on the date they are suffered; thereafter the plaintiff may
sue to recover them at any time within four years from the date they
were inflicted."1 0 7 The Court reasoned that without this exception,
future damages that could not be proved within the limitations period
would be unrecoverable and this would be contrary to congressional
intent. 0 8 So, unless the exception applies, under the Clayton Act
rule, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the
unlawful act that injures the plaintiffs business.1 09 The Clayton Act
accrual rule as declared in Zenith is a separate accrual rule. In other
words, each time the plaintiff is injured by a violation of the statute,
he has a new cause of action with a separate limitations period.
While the majority of the Supreme Court in Klehr refused to
decide on an accrual rule for civil RICO, Justice Scalia wrote a concur-
ring opinion in which he argued for the adoption of the Clayton Act
accrual rule.' 1 0 Justice Scalia began his concurrence by criticizing the
majority for its refusal to resolve the circuit split by adopting a single
accrual rule for RICO. 11 To Justice Scalia, deciding what accrual rule
106 Id. at 338-39 (citations omitted).
107 Id. at 339.
108 Id. at 340.
109 But see infra note 121.
110 Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 198 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).
111 Id. at 196-97. The majority justified its refusal to choose an accrual rule for
RICO by pointing out the complex interaction between accrual rules and tolling rules
and arguing that because of that complex interaction and the significant legal conse-
quences of that interaction (either a claim will be barred or not) it was not yet ready
to decide on an accrual rule for RICO. See id. at 192-93 (majority opinion). In Part
III, I discuss how the discovery rule and the Clayton Act accrual rule ought to interact
with federal tolling principles to best achieve the purposes of statutes of limitations.
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to apply to RICO was not as agonizingly difficult as the majority
seemed to think; rather, the answer was self-evident.' 1 2 Because the
Court had previously adopted the Clayton Act's four-year limitations
period for RICO, it was now bound to adopt the Clayton Act accrual
rule:
We have said that " [a] ny period of limitation .. . is understood
fully only in the context of the various circumstances that suspend it
from running against a particular cause of action." It is just as true,
I think, that any period of limitation is utterly meaningless without
specification of the event that starts it running. As a practical mat-
ter, a 4-year statute of limitations means nothing at all unless one
knows when the four years start running. If they start, for example,
on the 10th anniversary of the injury, the 4-year statute is more akin
to a 14-year statute than to the Clayton Act. We would thus have
been foolish, in Malley-Duff to speak of "adopting" the Clayton Act
statute, and of "patterning" the RICO limitations period after the
Clayton Act, if all we meant was using the Clayton Act number of
years."13
Justice Scalia then suggested that by refusing to adopt the Clayton
Act accrual rule the majority was engaging in judicial lawmaking.1 1 4
This, according to Justice Scalia, is why the Court was having such a
difficult time deciding on an accrual rule: "It is ... no wonder that the
Court finds the question it has posed for itself today 'subtle and diffi-
cult'; judicial policywonking is endlessly demanding, and constructing
a statute of limitations is much more complicated than adopting
one."115 In sum, Justice Scalia argued that "[w]hen [the Court]
adopt[s] a statute of limitations from an analogous federal cause of
action [it ought to] adopt it in whole, with all its accoutrements."" 6
In spite ofJustice Scalia's strong argument for adopting the Clay-
ton Act accrual rule, no circuit court has since applied the Clayton Act
accrual rule to civil RICO."17 This is not particularly surprising given
that by the time of Klehr the discovery rule had become the default
accrual rule."18 Furthermore, leaving aside for now the arguments
112 See id. at 198-99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
113 Id. at 199 (citation omitted) (quotingJohnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 463 (1975)).
114 See id. at 200.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 201.
117 In fact, no circuit court has ever applied the Clayton Act rule to civil RICO.
However, a few district courts have. See, e.g., Gilbert Family P'ship v. Nido Corp., 679
F. Supp. 679, 686 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Wabash Publ'g Co. v. Dermer, 650 F. Supp. 212,
216-17 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
118 See Klehr, 521 U.S. at 191.
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put forward by Justice Scalia, the Clayton Act rule does not seem like a
particularly good fit for RICO. The Clayton Act accrual rule suffers
from the same problems as the discovery rule' 19 : (1) it ignores RICO's
pattern element, 120 and thus may start the limitations period running
before the plaintiff can legally bring a RICO claim; and (2) it ignores
the complexity of a RICO claim and starts the limitations period run-
ning regardless of when the plaintiff discovers the pattern of illegal
acts and who is responsible for that pattern. These problems are com-
pounded under the Clayton Act rule because, unlike the discovery
rule, it starts the limitations period running when the injury occurs.
Thus, the limitations period may begin to run even before the plain-
tiff is aware of his injury.121
The Clayton Act accrual rule does have a few positive attributes
that might benefit RICO plaintiffs. For instance, under the Clayton
119 See supra text accompanying notes 93-103.
120 This is not surprising because the Clayton Act accrual rule was created with
reference to the Clayton Act, which does not require a pattern.
121 In Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), the Second Cir-
cuit suggested that the Clayton Act accrual rule includes a discovery principle. Id. at
1103-04. Since then, however, the Second Circuit has applied the rule from Zenith,
which has no discovery element. See Higgins v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. 942 F.2d 829,
832 (2d Cir. 1991). The Second Circuit can hardly be faulted for the mix-up given
Zenith's imprecise iteration of the rule. In fact, there has been much confusion
among federal courts as to when exactly the Clayton Act's statute of limitations
accrues. In Zenith, the Supreme Court attempted to set out an accrual rule for the
Clayton Act, but the Court used imprecise and confusing language that suggested that
the statute of limitations accrues when the defendant commits the unlawful act and
not when the plaintiff suffers injury. See supra text accompanying note 106. This
interpretation of the Clayton Act accrual rule does not make sense, however, unless
one assumes that the injury occurs simultaneously with the wrongful act. Otherwise,
this accrual rule would violate the fundamental principle that a cause of action should
not accrue until all the events have occurred that enable the plaintiff to maintain a
suit under the cause of action at issue. After all, a plaintiff cannot sue under the
Clayton Act until he has actually suffered injury. Nonetheless, circuit courts have gen-
erally adopted this imprecise iteration of the Clayton Act accrual rule. See, e.g., Pace
Indus., Inc. v. Three Phoenix Co., 813 F.2d 234, 237 (9th Cir. 1987) ("A cause of
action in antitrust accrues each time a plaintiff is injured by an act of the defendant
and the statute of limitations runs from the commission of the act."). Of course, it is
hard to blame these circuit courts because they are bound to follow Zenith. Still, the
better interpretation of the Clayton Act accrual rule is that the Clayton Act's limita-
tions period begins to run upon the occurrence of the injury. It is this version of the
Clayton Act accrual rule that the Supreme Court seemed to endorse in Rotella. See
Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 554 n.2, 557 (2000) (referring to the Clayton Act
accrual rule as an "injury occurrence rule" and an "injury-focused accrual rule").
However, at least one circuit court has gone completely off the tracks and applied the
discovery rule to claims under the Clayton Act. See In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436
F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2006).
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Act rule, for each separate injury the plaintiff can recover future dam-
ages, and when those future damages are too speculative, the cause of
action does not accrue until the date they are suffered. Thus, if five
years after a RICO violation a plaintiff suffers injuries to his business
or property that were previously too speculative to prove, under the
Clayton Act rule, he would still be able to recover for those injuries.122
III. TOLLING THE RICO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The length of the RICO limitations period is well settled and
though the Supreme Court has not definitively spoken on when a
RICO claim accrues the circuit courts have coalesced around the dis-
covery rule. This leaves the last aspect of the RICO statute of limita-
tion-tolling.
One of the most misleading aspects of statutes of limitations is
that they involve more than a simple mathematical calculation. Just
because a civil RICO plaintiff files his claim more than four years after
the date of accrual does not mean that the claim is barred. This is
because courts (and legislatures) have determined that in some cases
the purposes that statutes of limitations serve are outweighed by the
plaintiffs interest in bringing a legitimate claim.123 Thus, courts (and
legislatures) have developed rules that toll the statute of limitations.
A tolling rule can affect a statute of limitations in one of three
ways-it can suspend the running of the limitations period; it can
extend the limitations period; or it can renew or revive the limitations
period.124 When a tolling rule suspends the limitations period, the
limitations period stops running until the circumstances that tolled
the limitations period no longer exist; at that point, the clock starts
again and the plaintiff has the remainder of the limitations period to
file his claim. 125 When a tolling rule extends the limitations period,
the original length of the limitations period and the time remaining
on it when the tolling condition arose are irrelevant.126 Instead, the
extension rule establishes a new (usually relatively short) limitations
122 See supra text accompanying note 107.
123 See Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) ("This policy of
repose, designed to protect defendants, is frequently outweighed, however, where the
interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiffs rights."). Of course, when
creating and applying tolling provisions, courts (and legislatures) must make sure that
the exception does not swallow the rule and vitiate the statute of limitations.
124 See Kathleen L. Cerveny, Note, Limitation Tolling When Class Status Denied:
Chardon v. Fumero Soto and Alice in Wonderland, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 686, 689
(1985).
125 See id.
126 See id. at 689-90.
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period within which the plaintiff must file his claim. 127 Finally, when a
tolling rule renews or revives the limitations period, the clock is reset
and starts running all over again as if the cause of action has just
accrued.128
Federal tolling rules129 can be complex and confusing. This is
partly because federal courts use inconsistent terminology to refer to
the same tolling concepts and/or classify the same tolling concepts in
different categories. Fortunately, this imprecision has not generally
affected the scope and application of tolling rules. For the purposes
of this Part, it will be sufficient to classify federal tolling rules into two
broad categories: common law tolling rules (those made by judges)
and statutory tolling rules (those enacted by Congress). This Part will
introduce those federal tolling rules that can most profitably be
applied to civil RICO claims and explain how and why each tolling
rule ought to apply to RICO claims. The overall goal of this Part is to
show how currently available federal tolling rules can be applied to
individual RICO cases to achieve a complete and coherent statute of
limitations for civil RICO claims that balances the purposes of statutes
of limitations with fairness to injured plaintiffs.
A. Common Law Tolling Rules
Given that the discovery rule, for all practical purposes, governs
the accrual of all civil RICO claims brought in federal courts, what can
courts do to address the unfairness that can result when the discovery
rule is applied to civil RICO? After Klehr and Rotella, are we now stuck
with an accrual rule that will prevent some plaintiffs from vindicating
legitimate RICO claims even when they have not slept on their rights?
I think not. Courts and commentators were quick to point out the
flaws in the discovery rule, but they tended to try to solve these
problems by coming up with complex accrual rules. 30 The Supreme
Court twice rejected this approach, pointing out that, even though the
127 See id.
128 See id. at 690.
129 When discussing tolling of the RICO statute of limitations, the relevant tolling
rules are federal rules not state rules. See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d
1190, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988). This is because the statute of limitations that governs
RICO actions derives from federal law. See id. In contrast, when federal courts apply
state statutes of limitations to federal causes of action, as with § 1983 claims, state
tolling rules apply unless they are inconsistent with federal law. See Bd. of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1980).
130 See, e.g., Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546,
1554-55 (11th Cir. 1990); Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1130-31 (3d
Cir. 1988); Mumford, supra note 103, at 1302-03; O'Neill, supra note 94, at 235.
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discovery rule was not perfect, the problems associated with the dis-
covery rule did not affect every case. 131 The Court suggested that the
best way to deal with these problems is not to come up with universal,
difficult to administer accrual rules that unduly extend the limitations
period, but to apply tolling rules in individual cases to prevent injus-
tice. 132 For the remainder of this Note, I will take up the Court's sug-
gestion and show how lower courts can apply federal tolling rules to
individual cases to ameliorate the problems associated with the discov-
ery rule (and the Clayton Act accrual rule) and to develop a complete,
coherent, and balanced body of law on the RICO statute of
limitations.
1. The Continuing Violation Doctrine
The biggest problem associated with the discovery rule is that it
can start the RICO statute of limitations running even before a plain-
tiff can legally bring a RICO claim.13 3 In Limestone Development Corp. v.
Village ofLemont,J3 4 judge Posner suggested a solution to this problem.
In Limestone, the court was not confronted with a situation where the
plaintiff discovered his injury more than four years before the defen-
dant committed enough predicate acts to constitute a pattern. 1 35 But,
Judge Posner suggested that if this were the case, the plaintiff would
still be able to recover for his initial injury under RICO due to the
continuing violation doctrine. 3 6 Judge Posner stated that the contin-
uing violation doctrine is misnamed: "The office of the misnamed
doctrine is to allow suit to be delayed until a series of wrongful acts
blossoms into an injury on which suit can be brought. It is thus a
doctrine not about a continuing, but about a cumulative, violation."137
To explain the continuing violation doctrine, Judge Posner used a
sexual harassment claim as an example: "The first instance of a
coworker's offensive words or actions may be too trivial to count as
actionable harassment, but if they continue they may eventually reach
that level and then the entire series is actionable."13 8 Once the series
becomes actionable, the victim can sue and recover for all the
instances of harassment that make up the cause of action regardless of
131 See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 558 n.4, 560-61 (2000).
132 See id. at 560-61 ("The virtue of relying on equitable tolling lies in the very
nature of such tolling as the exception, not the rule.").
133 See supra text accompanying notes 93-103.
134 520 F.3d 797 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J.).
135 Id. at 802.
136 Id. at 801-02.
137 Id. at 801 (citation omitted).
138 Id.
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when they occurred. 3 9 According to Judge Posner, this principle
could be applied to RICO.14 0 By relying on the continuing violation
doctrine, a RICO plaintiff would not have to bring suit until enough
predicate acts accumulate to form an actionable pattern. 14 1 When
this happens, the plaintiff could recover for all the injuries that
resulted from that pattern even if they were discovered more than
four years before the claim was filed.142 The solution Judge Posner
suggested in Limestone would essentially delay the accrual of a RICO
cause of action until an actionable pattern of racketeering has actually
occurred. Thus, in those cases where the discovery rule would start
the RICO limitations period running before the plaintiff could legally
file a RICO claim, courts can apply the continuing violation doctrine
to prevent this injustice.
The continuing violation doctrine, however, will have to be some-
what modified when applied to RICO. Generally, the continuing vio-
lation doctrine is said to delay accrual until the course of conduct that
constitutes the continuing violation ceases.143 If this iteration of the
continuing violation doctrine were to govern RICO, then courts
would simply be applying the last predicate act rulel 44 under a differ-
ent name. Even though the continuing violation rule, unlike the last
predicate act rule, would only apply in special circumstances, it would
probably still be inappropriate for lower courts to adopt this version of
the continuing violation rule after the Supreme Court in Klehr so
resoundingly rejected the last predicate act rule. 45 Thus, when
courts find it appropriate to apply the continuing violation rule to
RICO claims to prevent unfairness to plaintiffs, they should take care
not to grant plaintiffs a windfall by unduly extending the limitations
period. The best way for courts to balance these concerns is to apply a
more restrained version of the continuing violation rule-one where
a RICO claim accrues not upon the occurrence of the last predicate
act but as soon as enough related predicate acts have occurred to con-
stitute a pattern. Under this application of the continuing violation
139 See id.
140 Id.
141 See id. at 801-02.
142 See id.
143 Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("It is well-settled that
'[w]hen a tort involves continuing injury, the cause of action accrues, and the limita-
tion period begins to run, at the time the tortious conduct ceases.'" (alteration in
original) (quoting Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 529 (5th Cir. 1974))).
144 See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 59-71.
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rule, the RICO statute of limitations accrues when the plaintiff is
legally able to bring a civil RICO claim, not before and not after.
Though I have placed this discussion of the continuing violation
doctrine in this subpart on judge-made tolling rules, it is actually bet-
ter characterized as "a doctrine governing accrual."14 6 Nonetheless, I
have chosen to place the continuing violation rule here because it is
not a general accrual rule and therefore it operates more like a com-
mon law tolling rule in that courts can apply it to individual cases to
prevent injustice. Furthermore, whether the continuing violation rule
is called a tolling doctrine or an accrual doctrine does not much mat-
ter in the context of RICO because federal law governs both aspects of
the RICO statute of limitations.147 For the rest of this subpart, I will
discuss more traditional common law tolling rules and how they may
be applied to civil RICO claims, in conjunction with the continuing
violation doctrine, to ameliorate the problems associated with the dis-
covery rule.
2. Equitable Estoppel
Equitable estoppel and equitable tolling are two distinct tolling
doctrines that also encompass more specific tolling rules. Though
these doctrines are different, "[m]any cases .. . fuse the two doctrines,
presumably inadvertently."' 4 8 The best explanation of the distinction
between the two doctrines can be found in Cada v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp.149 In Cada, Judge Posner defined equitable estoppel as "a gen-
eral equity principle not limited to the statute of limitations con-
text .. . which comes into play if the defendant takes active steps to
prevent the plaintiff from suing in time[ ]."1o While equitable estop-
pel focuses on the wrongful actions of the defendant, equitable tolling
focuses on the plaintiff-it "permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the
statute of limitations if despite all due diligence he is unable to obtain
146 Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.). There are
some circuit court cases, however, that refer to it as a tolling rule. See id. (listing
cases).
147 When federal courts have to borrow state limitations periods for federal causes
of action, federal law governs the point at which the state limitations period accrues
whereas state law governs when the state limitations period is tolled. See Lowenthal et
al., supra note 18, at 1086, 1092-93. In situations like this, it will make a difference
whether the continuing violation doctrine is classified as an accrual rule or a tolling
rule.
148 Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 452 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,
J.).
149 Id.
150 Id. at 450.
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vital information bearing on the existence of his claim."15' Equitable
estoppel and equitable tolling principles are both generally applicable
to all federal statutes of limitations.152
Equitable estoppel encompasses a tolling doctrine called fraudu-
lent concealment.153 It is important, however, to recognize that equi-
table estoppel and fraudulent concealment are not one and the
same. 15 4 For example, if a defendant promises not to plead the stat-
ute of limitations and thereby induces the plaintiff to delay filing his
claim, then the doctrine of equitable estoppel may save the plaintiffs
claim whereas the doctrine of fraudulent concealment is simply not
applicable.155 In this subpart, I focus on the doctrine of fraudulent
concealment because other applications of the equitable estoppel
doctrine are narrow and involve rather rare circumstances whereas
fraudulent concealment is often pled to toll federal statutes of limita-
tions governing all types of claims.156
The doctrine of fraudulent concealment is one of the oldest equi-
table exceptions to statutes of limitations. The Supreme Court first
recognized it in 1874 in Bailey v. Glover 5 7 :
[W]here the party injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it
without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of
the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered,
though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of
the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of
the other party.15 8
The Court justified this equitable exception on the grounds that with-
out it statutes of limitations, which were designed to prevent frauds,
would actually end up encouraging potential defendants to engage in
fraud to cover up their misdeeds until they could plead the statute of
limitations.' 59
Though the language the Court used in Bailey suggests that the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment only applies in fraud cases, the
Supreme Court later held that this doctrine "is read into every federal
151 Id. at 451.
152 See id.
153 Id. Some courts have referred to it as an equitable tolling rule. See, e.g., Grim-
mett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 514 (9th Cir. 1996).
154 Wolin v. Smith Barney Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 855 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.).
155 See Cada, 920 F.2d at 451.
156 See, e.g., Texas v. Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d 1526, 1527 (5th Cir. 1988) (plead-
ing fraudulent concealment in an antitrust action).
157 88 U.S. 342 (1874).
158 Id. at 348.
159 See id. at 349.
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statute of limitation."16 0 Roughly stated, under fraudulent conceal-
ment as the doctrine exists today, if the defendant fraudulently con-
ceals from the plaintiff the facts that make up his cause of action, the
statute is tolled for the length of that concealment. 6 I Exactly what
conduct on the defendant's part is required under fraudulent con-
cealment is a problem that has plagued the courts. 1 6 2 Generally
courts agree that the defendant has to make some effort to conceal his
wrongdoing.16 3 The easiest case is when the defendant engages in
"active concealment" by actively taking steps that are distinct from the
original wrongful act and that are intended to conceal that original
wrongful act.16 4 Many courts, however, have used a lesser standard.
These courts have held that even if a defendant has not engaged in
active concealment, he has done enough to satisfy the fraudulent con-
cealment standard simply by committing a so-called "self-concealing
act"-"an act committed during the course of the original [wrong]
that has the effect of concealing the [wrong] from its victims." 16 5
Because RICO is governed by a federal statute of limitations, the
doctrine of fraudulent concealment ought to apply to RICO claims.
In Klehr, the Supreme Court held that fraudulent concealment could
toll the RICO statute of limitations.' 66 The issue in Klehr was whether
a plaintiff pleading fraudulent concealment had to have exercised rea-
sonable diligence in order to benefit from the doctrine.1 67 There was
a split in the circuits over this issue. Some circuits held that because
fraudulent concealment focuses on the defendant's actions, it does
not matter whether or not the plaintiff was reasonably diligent, while
other circuits held that a plaintiff had to be reasonably diligent in
order to benefit from the doctrine.1 6 8 Limiting its holding to the con-
text of a civil RICO claim, the Supreme Court held that "a plaintiff
who is not reasonably diligent may not assert 'fraudulent conceal-
ment."1 69 The Court so held because in the antitrust context the
160 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946).
161 See Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 71 F.3d 119,
122 (4th Cir. 1995).
162 See Wolin v. Smith Barney Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 851 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, J.).
This is practically an understatement. See Supermarket of Marlinton, 71 F.3d at 122-26
(distinguishing between three standards for fraudulent concealment just in the anti-
trust context).
163 See Wolin, 83 F.3d at 851.
164 See id. at 852.
165 Id.
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lower federal courts had consistently required the plaintiff to exercise
reasonable diligence in order to invoke the fraudulent concealment
doctrine.170 Thus, once again, the Court relied on the RICO/anti-
trust parallel to rule on a RICO statute of limitations issue.
It is beyond the scope of this Note to describe the exact contours
of the fraudulent concealment doctrine as it is applied to RICO. Even
without a detailed examination, though, it is clear that the fraudulent
concealment doctrine, just like the continuing violation doctrine, may
be beneficially applied to civil RICO claims to prevent injustices to
plaintiffs. There is much overlap between the fraudulent conceal-
ment doctrine and the discovery rule (especially if due diligence is
required for fraudulent concealment). 17 1 For example, a plaintiff
who does not have the benefit of the discovery rule can achieve the
same result by showing that the defendant fraudulently concealed the
plaintiffs injury; in this case, the statute of limitations would be
"tolled until the injured party discovers, or with due diligence could
have discovered, the injury."17 2 Of course, the discovery rule delays
the accrual of the statute of limitations automatically, whereas under
fraudulent concealment the plaintiff must show that the defendant
acted in some way to conceal his wrongdoing. Because of the overlap
between the discovery rule and the fraudulent concealment doctrine
and the additional difficulty of proving fraudulent concealment, the
fraudulent concealment doctrine would be most useful in the RICO
context if in the future some circuit court decides to adopt the Clay-
ton Act accrual rule.
Even if the circuit courts continue to apply the discovery rule,
however, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment may still be of some
use to RICO plaintiffs. For example, imagine a situation where a
plaintiff is aware that he has been injured, but is unaware that his
injury is the result of wrongdoing because the perpetrator has con-
cealed his wrongful actions. If this sort of situation were to happen in
a RICO case, the plaintiff would be in trouble because the four-year
statute of limitations would start to run right when he discovered his
injury; yet, because of the concealment, it could be years before the
diligent plaintiff discovers that his injury was caused by wrongful
acts-by a pattern of racketeering. If, in a case like this, the discovery
rule was not tempered by the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, the
plaintiffs claim could be barred in spite of his diligence while the
170 Id. at 194-95.
171 See O'Neill, supra note 94, at 215-16.
172 Ashland Oil Co. of Cal. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 567 F.2d 984, 988 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1977).
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defendant could be rewarded for his wrongful concealment. In the
past, courts may have avoided this unjust outcome by applying the
injury and pattern discovery rule, but, as the Supreme Court noted in
Rotella, this general accrual rule is too broad in that it unduly extends
the limitations period where it is unnecessary to do So.173 The better
approach to curing this defect in the discovery rule is to recognize an
equitable exception. 17 4
3. Equitable Tolling
As noted above, equitable tolling operates to toll the statute of
limitations when the plaintiff, despite all due diligence, "is unable to
obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim" such as
whether his injury is due to wrongdoing or who is responsible for that
wrongdoing.'7 5 The distinction between equitable estoppel and equi-
table tolling is important, because when the plaintiff pleads equitable
tolling, he does not have to show wrongdoing on the part of the
defendant. 176 The corollary of this principle is that under equitable
tolling, the court has more discretion as to whether to toll the limita-
tions period and if so for how long.1 77 As Judge Posner explained in
Cada, "if fraudulent concealment is shown the court must subtract
from the period of limitations the entire period in which the tolling
condition is in effect, for otherwise the defendant would obtain a ben-
efit from his inequitable conduct."17 However, because equitable
tolling "adjusts the rights of two innocent parties," Judge Posner con-
cluded that "equitable tolling should [not] bring about an automatic
extension of the statute of limitations by the length of the tolling
period or any other definite term."179 Instead, Judge Posner asserted
that equitable tolling should be applied flexibly but somewhat reluc-
tantly-the plaintiff should be given some extra time if he has been
diligent180 and if he needs it, but statutes of limitations serve impor-
tant purposes so courts should be careful not to "trivialize [them] by
promiscuous application of tolling doctrines."8 " With these concerns
in mind, the Seventh Circuit held "that a plaintiff who invokes equita-
173 See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000).
174 See id. at 560-61.
175 Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,
J.).
176 See id.
177 See id. at 452.
178 Id. (citation omitted).
179 Id.
180 See, e.g., Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984).
181 See Cada, 920 F.2d at 453.
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ble tolling to suspend the statute of limitations must bring suit within
a reasonable time after he has obtained, or by due diligence could
have obtained, the necessary information." 8 2
Many commentators have complained that statutes of limitations
are arbitrary because they apply rigidly and uniformly to every case,
sometimes barring claims where evidence is plentiful and a careful
balancing of the interests at stake weighs in favor of the plaintiff, and
other times allowing claims to go forward when much evidence has
been lost and equities weigh in favor of repose for the defendant and
society.s83 The doctrine of equitable tolling responds to this criticism,
at least in part, because it allows federal courts to (in effect) extend
the limitations period when the equities weigh in favor of the plaintiff.
In so doing, courts are able to add some flexibility to federal statutes
of limitations.
This is just the sort of flexible case-by-case approach that federal
courts should use when dealing with civil RICO claims. One of the
criticisms of the discovery accrual rule was that it ignored the com-
plexity of the RICO cause of action and started the statute of limita-
tions running before the plaintiff knew of the acts that constituted the
pattern of racketeering and who was responsible for those acts. 184
When courts tried to address this problem with complex accrual rules,
however, they did not adequately take into account the interests of the
defendant and society in "repose, [the] elimination of stale claims,
and certainty." 185 In other words, the proposed solution was over-
broad. In an attempt to ensure fairness to plaintiffs, the lower courts
had unnecessarily undercut the purposes of statutes of limitations. As
the Supreme Court recognized, the better way to deal with this prob-
lem is not to try to devise the perfect accrual rule, but rather to look
towards the third aspect of statutes of limitations-tolling. Equitable
tolling is perfect for mitigating any unfairness that might result from
the application of the discovery rule to civil RICO claims because it
can be applied even if the defendant has not engaged in any wrongdo-
ing and courts have great flexibility to weigh the equities in each case
in order to reach the appropriate balance between the plaintiff's
interests and those of defendants and society.
182 Id.
183 See Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes of Limitations, 45 AM. Clum. L.
REv. 115, 117-18 (2008).
184 See supra text accompanying note 103.
185 Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000).
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B. Statutory Tolling Rules
In this subpart, the focus shifts from judge-made tolling rules to
those tolling rules that have been enacted by Congress. For the pur-
poses of this Note, there is only one relevant statutory tolling rule, that
from the Clayton Act that tolls the running of the statute of limitations
for private civil actions during the pendency of a civil or criminal pro-
ceeding instituted by the United States that is based on the same facts.
This tolling rule was enacted in 1955 as an amendment to the Clayton
Act.186 It provides:
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the
United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the
antitrust laws, but not including an action under section 15a of this
title, the running of the statute of limitations in respect to every
private or State right of action arising under said laws and based in
whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding
shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year
thereafter: Provided, however, That whenever the running of the stat-
ute of limitations in respect of a cause of action arising under sec-
tion 15 or 15c of this title is suspended hereunder, any action to
enforce such cause of action shall be forever barred unless com-
menced either within the period of suspension or within four years
after the cause of action accrued.'8 7
The purpose of this statutory tolling rule is "to ensure that private
litigants . . . have the benefit of prior Government antitrust enforce-
ment efforts." 8 8 The federal courts have generally interpreted this
tolling rule broadly in order to effectuate this purpose. For example:
"Once the filing of a government complaint or indictment starts the
tolling period, '[g] overnment litigation continues to pend against
each of the defendants until concluded as to all' and thus continues
to toll the limitation period against settled defendants until the litiga-
tion against all the other defendants is terminated."' 8 9
186 See Act ofJuly 7, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-137, § 5(b), 69 Stat. 282, 283 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (2006)).
187 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) (2006). Originally, the Clayton Act did not contain a statute
of limitations for civil actions. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, 28 Stat. 730 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (2006)). It did, however, contain a tolling provision
that suspended the applicable state statute of limitations during the pendency of a
suit or criminal prosecution by the United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 5 (2006). Thus,
before the Clayton Act even had a federal statute of limitations it had a federal tolling
rule.
188 Greyhound Corp., v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 334 (1978).
189 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTrrRusT LAW 11 321a (3d ed.
2007).
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In the previous subpart, I showed how courts could apply equita-
ble tolling principles to RICO claims in order to temper any unfair-
ness that results when the discovery accrual rule governs. The
application of these tolling rules leads to a less disjointed, more bal-
anced RICO statute of limitations. But, even after taking these tolling
rules into consideration, the RICO statute of limitations is still incom-
plete. As Justice Scalia persuasively argued in Klehr, when the
Supreme Court "adopt[s] a statute of limitations from an analogous
federal cause of action [it ought to] adopt it in whole, with all its
accoutrements." 190 After all, when the Supreme Court adopted the
Clayton Act's four-year statute of limitations to govern civil RICO
claims it was not just adopting a number. The Court specifically chose
the Clayton Act's limitations period because that statute was the most
analogous to RICO. 91 Based on these principles, federal courts
ought to adopt for civil RICO claims the Clayton Act's statutory tolling
rule, § 16(i).
This perhaps seems like an obvious point, but it is not for two
reasons. First, the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court itself
have resisted Justice Scalia's argument in the accrual context. Second,
even if courts would be willing to follow Justice Scalia's logic in the
tolling context, it seems that practitioners are unaware of this possibil-
ity. In over twenty years since the Supreme Court first adopted the
Clayton Act's statute of limitations for civil RICO, only two reported
cases have even mentioned the possibility of applying § 16(i) to civil
RICO.192 It seems improbable that plaintiffs are taking advantage of
this tolling rule without generating any reported cases especially given
the uniqueness of the issue and the sheer volume of RICO litigation.
The argument Justice Scalia put forward in Klehr enables lower
federal courts to justifiably apply § 16(i) to civil RICO claims without
being accused of legislating from the bench for, according to Justice
Scalia, once a court adopts a statute of limitations by analogy, it ought
to adopt it in its entirety, not just pick and choose the parts of it that
the court prefers.193 However, if it were a matter of preference, there
are strong policy reasons why § 16(i) ought to be applied to RICO.
First of all, this tolling rule would be good for RICO plaintiffs in the
same way that it is good for antitrust plaintiffs in that it allows plain-
tiffs to benefit from the government's investigative work. RICO claims
190 Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 201 (1997).
191 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
192 See Coal-Mac, Inc. v. JRM Coal Co., 743 F. Supp. 499, 501-02 (E.D. Ky. 1990);
Pension Fund-Mid-Jersey Trucking Indus. v. Omni Funding Group, 687 F. Supp. 962,
963 (D.N.J. 1988).
193 See Klehr, 521 U.S. at 200-01.
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are complex and a plaintiff may not even be aware that he has a RICO
claim until the government comes out with indictments or files its own
claim. Even if a plaintiff is aware that he may have a claim under
RICO, he may lack the necessary resources to properly investigate his
claim. Adopting this tolling rule would also be consistent with the
purposes behind statutes of limitations. Once the government indicts
or files its claim, the defendant is on notice and will certainly work to
preserve evidence relating to the factual matter at issue. Furthermore,
this tolling rule benefits society by allowing courts to avoid duplicitous
litigation.
CONCLUSION
Forty years after Congress enacted RICO, courts are still strug-
gling with statute of limitations issues. This is because courts and
commentators alike have taken a piecemeal, disjointed approach to
the statute of limitations instead of examining how the three aspects
of the statute of limitations (length of limitations period, accrual, and
tolling) work in concert. In particular, courts and commentators have
been guilty of trying to solve the problems associated with the RICO
statute of limitations (problems which resulted in unfairness to plain-
tiffs) by coming up with complex accrual rules (rules which resulted
in unfairness to defendants). In this Note, I have shown how all the
problems that courts and commentators have identified can be solved
through the application of federal tolling rules to individual cases.
This is the best solution because it is consistent with the current state
of the law, and it balances the purposes of statutes of limitations with
fairness to plaintiffs. I have concluded my comprehensive analysis of
the RICO statute of limitations by suggesting that courts apply the
Clayton Act tolling rule, § 16(i), to civil RICO claims when the United
States has previously brought a RICO case based on the same facts.
This is both appropriate and necessary because when a court adopts a
statute of limitations it ought to adopt it in its entirety, for a statute of
limitations can only be fully understood in light of when it accrues
and the circumstances that toll it.
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